Second Language Acquisition and Teaching; Final Quiz Study Guide.


  1. What are the fundamental beliefs of Behaviorism about language?  How do these translate into language teaching methods (think ALM)?  What are some critiques of Behaviorism?Fundamental beliefs of Behaviorism are that:
    (1) Knowledge is experience-based
    (2) Learning is the establishment of a stimulus response connection (learning being a stimulus-response).
    Behaviorism can only happen through habit formation.
    Behaviorism can only examine observable-phenomena, therefore making no non-existent speculation.
    Behaviorism focuses only on performance, rather than on what input is being acquired. This translates to teaching methods that lead to misunderstandings.
  1. What are Chomsky’s fundamental beliefs about language?  In particular, how do mentalists/generativists investigate linguistic knowledge of native speakers?Chomsky’s fundamental beliefs on language (and on syntax) marked an epoch in linguistic study. Instead of following the Behaviorism model, Chomsky argued to “identify competence” of mental grammar that allows one to make a sentence and “analyze performance”, which is what is said.
    Chomsky’s Mentalist approach differed from Behaviorism by performance being key.
    Chomsky’s fundamental beliefs about language are:
    Language Acquisition Device- Also known as the “Language Organ”, is a mental organ, which activates during the critical period to help a language learner to organize input and to see the patterns of language. Everything in a developmental sequence is due to this activation of the LAD.
    Universal Grammar- Chomsky suggests that some rules of grammar are “hard-wired” to the brain, allowing language to be learned without it being taught. Universal Grammar refers to a common structural basis of all languages.
    Poverty of the Stimulus- This theory is made up of 3 main ideas:
    (1) In ordinary speech, children aren’t exposed to enough speech to understand it fully, so a structure is needed (Universal Grammar).
    (2) Usually language learners are not given information on how to modify speech, which is fixed by Universal Grammar.
    (3) Teaching and correction have no measurable effect on the target language, and input only provides “positive evidence” of what is target-like. (But never explains what is not target-like.)
  1. Krashen’s approach to SLA is an outgrowth of the mentalist approach to language —what are the 5 key hypotheses in Krashen’s model?  Be prepared to critique each of Krashen’s hypotheses.The Mentalist approach to SLA follows the idea that the L2 must follow the Universal Grammar constraints, but Krashen’s SLA theory emphasizes the function of age and set parameters, known as the critical period.
    Krashen’s theory follows 5 hypotheses:
    (1) There is a difference between Acquisition (procedural) and Learning (declarative). Learned knowledge can’t ever transfer to acquired knowledge. This is also true neurologically, because different types of information are stored differently in the brain.
    (2) Natural Order Hypothesis- Elements of a language are acquired in a sequential order, also known as a morpheme order.
    (3) Monitor Hypothesis- Learned knowledge can act as a filter on one’s output, and fixes language-acquired errors. One must pay conscious attention to target-like speech and know the grammatical rules.
    (4) Input– Input must be only one level above the level known. (i+1) The LAD is activated by i+1 and Universal Grammar.
    (5) Affected Filter- Affection by motivation, attitude, self confidence and anxiety (cultural insecurities) prevents error input from being acquired, destroying SLA.
    Critiques of Krashen’s Hypotheses:
    Something to do with The Silent Period
  1. How does Krashen’s approach translate into language teaching methods (for examples, think Natural Method, TPR, immersion, sheltered-content ESL classes)?Krashen’s SLA theory translates in to 4 types of language teaching methods:
    (1) Total Physical Response (TPR)-
    (2) Immersion-
    (3) Sheltered-Content ESL-
    (4) Natural Method-
  1. Some critiques of Krashen’s model concern the establishment of acquired knowledge: by what process does input become acquired knowledge, and why does he claim that there is no process by which learned knowledge becomes acquired knowledge? If this is true, what are the implications for language teachers?Krashen’s theory states that learned knowledge never becomes acquired knowledge. The implication for language teachers would be, that classroom learning will never establish a L2 fluency.
  1. Know the difference between input and intake, and be prepared to discuss a range of factors that turn input into intake.  These factors should be organized around the issue of consciousness/attention (Krashen, Schmidt, Tomlin & Villa, Guion & Pederson, and Paradis).
  1. Be prepared to offer a loose characterization the entire interactionist paradigm, focusing on the role they claim interaction plays in turning input to intake.
  1. Name at least 5 characteristics of foreigner talk, or the way native speakers often modify their input when interacting with L2 learners.  Which of these (if any) do Interactionists consider to be facilitativeto acquisition?Foreigner Talk is when a native speaker modifies the input in an attempt to facilitate better communication with a L2 learner.
    5 Characteristics of Foreigner Talk include:

Reading Guide for Martin Heidegger’s “Being and Time” (1927). Chapter 4. §25-27


CHAPTER IV: Being-in-the-World as Being-with and Being a Self: The “They”

Page 111: Heidegger refers to two structures of Dasein, which are equiprimordial with being-in-the-world. Which are they?

Being-with (Mitsein) and Dasein-with (Mitdasein) are the two structures of Dasein, which exist equiprimordially with being-in-the-world.

§25. The Approach to the Existential Question of the ‘Who’ of Dasein

Pg. 112 “The who is answered in terms of the I itself, the ‘subject’, the ‘self’.” What do these determinations presuppose? What is problematic about these presuppositions?

The ‘self’ presupposes the objectivity of the person, however, not all things with objective presence are the ‘who’ of Dasein.

Pg. 113: What does Heidegger allude to when he says, “Dasein is, initially and for the most part, not itself”?

Heidegger uses this questioning of Dasein to establish that Dasein is the uncovering of itself within the phenomenal context of being. Dasein is itself existing.

Pg. 113: Why does “the positive interpretation of Dasein that has been given up to now” already forbid a point of departure from the formal givenness of the “I” in answering the question who Dasein is?

The “I”, as the ‘who’ of Dasein, is a mere subject, whereby not interacting with others, which is essential to Dasein’s uncovering of itself as being-in-the-world. “I” must be revealed in a phenomenal context to be the ‘who’ of Dasein.

Pg. 114: What “clues” does Heidegger indicate for answering the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein?

Because the ‘who’ is the essence of Dasein, and Dasein is grounded in existence, the first clue is to interpret the ‘who’ existentially. Because Dasein is itself existing, an existential-ontological questioning is appropriate.

§26 The Dasein-With of Others and Everyday Being-With

Pg. 114: How did the description of the surrounding world include others?

In the world, we exist with both objects and other Daseins. Heidegger explains that, “Others are ‘also encountered’ for whom the ‘work’ is to be done.” Wherein, others and objects are equirepresentational of each other, because they always exist within the context of the other.

Pg. 115: What distinguishes others from innerworldly things?

Others are not distinguished from oneself, rather, others are ‘among whom one also is.’ Others co-exist in the world, as where objects are merely present-at or ready-to-hand

Pg. 115: How is Dasein with others in average everydayness?

Dasein, as being-in-the-world, interacts with others as they are “being-there-too”. Innerwordly beings-in-themselves is Dasein-with.

Pg. 116: Explain the terms “with-world”, “being-with”, and “Dasein-with”.

“With-world”: “The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt].” “World” is the stage, in which Dasein is characterized through it’s existence “with” innerworldly others and objects. Whereby “being-with” is Dasein’s Being-in. Others then constitute the “Dasein-with”, because of their innerworldly existence.

Pg. 116: How does Dasein initially find “itself” and “others”?

Dasein finds itself through a phenomenal context of what is done, needed, expected and objectified in the “with-world”. Others are found because they are “being-with”, rather than being-for.

Pg. 117: What does Heidegger mean when he says that others become thematic in their Dasein, “they are not encountered as objectively present thing-persons”?

Heidegger means that the others are encountered while being-in-the-world, therefore encountered as a “Dasein-with”.

Pg. 117: What happens to Dasein’s relation to others while Dasein is factically alone?

Dasein is itself alone, but it’s existence is determinate on the being-in-the-world in which others exist, despite if they are physically present. Being alone and being-with are equiprimordial, meaning that Dasein’s relation to others doesn’t change, but it’s uncovering of itself is expanded.

Pg. 118: How does Heidegger characterize being-with in relation to care?

Care [Sorge] is what occurs because of Dasein’s contextual relationship with things in the world. Because Dasein doesn’t have this contextual relationship with other Dasein, others are a matter of concern [Fürsorge]. Concern is what is to be taken care of, for another. “Concern” expresses the relationship between one’s own Dasein, others and innerworldly things.

Pg. 118: Which modes of concern characterize the everyday being-with-one-another?

Being for-, against-, without-one-another, passing-another-by and not-mattering-to-one-another are all deficient and indifferent modes of concern which characterize everyday being-with-one-another.

Pg. 118: How do these modes of concern influence the way we commonly understand ourselves in relation to others?

Aforementioned modes of concern can mislead ontological interpretation of others are being merely objectively present, but can also highlight the “essential difference” between objects and “Dasein-with”.

Pg. 119: Explain the two positive modes of concern.

Concern can take the other Dasein’s care away from him. The other is then “dependent and dominated”. Concern can also constitute the taking care of things, which the other Dasein has yet to encounter. This mode of “authentic care” helps the other Dasein focus on momentary care [Sachlichkeit]

Pg. 119: How do “considerateness” and “tolerance” relate to “circumspection”? (Und die deutschen Wörter erhalten das Wort ‘sicht’.)

Circumspection [Umsicht] implies the looking-over of things in the world, which is what taking care of things also implies. Considerateness [Rücksicht] implies to watch out for someone’s best interests (to literally watch their back) and can relate to the first positive mode of concern, because it upholds the other (by their best interests/ by their back). Tolerance [Nachsicht] implies to watch out for what may transpire (to literally watch afterwards) and can then translates in to Authentic Care and Sachlichkeit.

Pg. 120: Heidegger points out how worldliness (the referential totality of significance) is rooted in the for-sake-of which, namely Dasein. How does this relate to being “for-the-sake-of-others”?

Being for-the-sake-of-others occurs because as being-with, Dasein is itself for the sake of others.

Pg. 120: How does this relate to understanding others?

Described as the ‘taking care of concern’, Heidegger explains that Dasein is an understanding of what is taken care of, whereby understanding one’s own Dasein as being-with is then an understanding of others.

Pg. 121: How does “closing oneself off” or “opening oneself up” to an other relate to being-with?

Both deficient modes of concern are rooted in being-with, which constitutes empathie, as an understanding of an other through oneself.

§27. Everyday Being a Self and They

Pg. 122: What does Heidegger mean when he says, “being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality“?

Distantiality emphasizes the necessity of Dasein to understand itself before understanding an other, distancing the self from the other.

Pg. 122: According to Heidegger, in everydayness, “Dasein stands in subservience to others.” What does this mean?

It means that Dasein is dependent on the innerworldly Dasein-with.

Pg. 123: How does the “they” (Man) unfold “it’s true dictatorship”?

Living in the same way as the “they”, Dasein loses the ability to ascertain the “they”, making [the they’s] “true dictatorship” unfold due to it’s necessity and inconspicuousness.

Pg. 123: What does Heidegger mean by ‘averageness’?

Dasein’s being-with relationship to the ‘they’ “prescribes the kind of being of everydayness”. In this everydayness, averageness exists because nothing is particularly spectacular, but is always a reflection of something else, which levels-it-down.

Pg. 123: How does “publicness” relate to the other ways of being of the “they”?

‘Publicness’ is constituted by distantiality (distancing our own Dasein from others), ‘averageness’ (reflection of all things upon the innerworldly things and others, with which we exist) and ‘leveling down’ (‘averageness’ demoting all concern). Publicness makes Dasein less genuine through the necessary being-with of Dasein, and yet exposes Dasein as familiar and accessible.

Pg. 124: What consequence does it have that the “they” disburdens Dasein in its everydayness?

The ‘they’ disburdens Dasein by relieving the necessity for Dasein to understand itself, as it is familiar and accessible through ‘publicness’. The consequence of this is that Dasein’s ‘who’ becomes the ‘they’, referring to everybody, and becoming inauthentic and inaccessible.

Pg. 124: In the manner of dependency and inauthenticity, Dasein is nevertheless “most real” [ens realissimum]. What does this mean?

The ‘most real’ subject of everydayness is the “I”, which, despite ‘publicness’ and the disburdening of Dasein by the ‘they’, there is not a lessening of facticity of Dasein.

Pg. 125: Why is the “they” not a universal subject?

It does not “hover over a plurality of subjects”.

Pg. 125: How is the discovery of the world different when Dasein is in the mode of the “they-self” in distinction to when Dasein is in the mode of the authentic self?

The authentic self has “explicity grasped itself” rather than the ‘they-self’, in which Dasein is “dispersed in the they”. Discovery of the world in the mode of the ‘they-self’ is merely a referential context, as where discovery of the world in the mode of the authentic self is that which uncovers and “clears away obscurities”.

Pg. 126: “By showing the positive phenomenon of closest everyday being-in-the-world, we have made possible an insight into the basic reason why the ontological interpretation of this constitution of being is lacking.” What is the reason?

Positive phenomenon, in which beings are understood in terms of the world, is lacking because being then becomes objectively present. Being cannot be objective, as it is busy being-in-the-world.

Pg. 126: What final indications does Heidegger give about the authentic self?

The authentic self has a gap between the “I” and it’s dependency on other innerworldly beings.