New Media as a Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge


New Media as a Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge

Erin T. Altman

21 March 2013



Conceptualization of the nation-state has a geopolitical history in territorial definition. Defined by political borders, the nation-state is comprised of citizens and non-citizens. Regulated by national policy, national education systems, economy and (other state regulation), citizens and non-citizens have specific experiential boundaries within the nation-state. Fast-forward to the 21st-century, introduction of the Internet increased rapid global communication. Uniting experiential differences with cross-border commonalities, the institution of “New Media” allowed life spheres once bounded by the nation-state to thrive in a global community. In this vein of rapid and broadened communication, does New Media undermine political hegemony?

An epoch of globalized knowledge has intrigued geographers and political philosophers alike. The Internet’s spectrum of information is mediated by the formalized interest in communication studies, and reaches a point of practical convergence in the field of Communication Geography. Beginning through the discourse of globalization under the Association of American Geographers’ ‘Geography of the Global Information Society’ in the late 1990s, Communication Geography now represents phenomenal points of geographic and political intrigue. Dissemination of knowledge over a non-physical space indicates a differentiation in geopolitical power from that of the post-modern age of print media. The epoch of New Media signals a revision in philosophies of communication, geography and power.

New Media’s relationship with the Internet is a viral one; increased access to the Internet and subsequent Internet enlargement are aspects of New Media’s definition of being ‘new, unregulated content’ (Lister, 2003). Inexorability of New Media has gained the attention of geographers and political philosophers, situating the Internet as an entity ‘without boundaries, without limitations, except through state regulation of media.’ (Lister, ibid). New Media is a broad representation of this exponential production of knowledge, unto a platform which is controllable only through governmental intervention with citizens’ freedoms to information. Content that faces scrutiny and regulation includes pornography, intellectual property, and anti-social movements. New Media’s ethical dimension calls in to question the moral biases, societal pressures and most importantly- political agendas in the globalized community.

The globalized community is defined in this case as those who have infrastructural ability to allow Internet access. Establishment of this ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ relationship echoes the economic mapping of modern nation states, and substantiates the discussion about New Media geopolitical philosophy by outlining the actors. For the sake of giving primacy to New Media politics, rather than global inequities, the ‘Core’ represents those countries whose annual income per capita is higher than the annual cost of an Internet-capable device. Because of the significant difference in income distribution, it is unnecessary to determine the cost of this computer, rather the ‘peripheral’ countries can be outlined by those misfortuned by civil war, populations with 1/3 prevalence of HIV/AIDS, infant death above 50% and other development indicators outlined by the United Nations (2000). Geopolitical inactivity of ‘peripheral’ countries allows ‘core’ countries to enable the discourse surrounding New Media’s information society.

Positioning New Media as an ‘information society’ clarifies its internal discourse separate from that mediated by state-civil society relations. Bringing to light the state-civil society relationship as different from the global-New Media relationship requires the understanding of nation-states as maintaining hegemonic power. Given that the modern livelihood of any societal actor is defined by citizenship through state legibility (O’Tuathail, 1998), New Media represents a differing societal discourse in its allowance for society to remain anonymous from a hegemony. Signifying again the global, a-political aspect of New Media discourse, anonymity of expression is adverse to the legibility of print media. New Media’s exponential increase in communication, coupled with the significant transcendence of non-economic geographic borders, lends to an institution of power that is not the nation-state.

In defining the nation-state against New Media, there is a blatant primacy in their different situations of power (Hanafi, 2005). Reflecting on the resource struggle that established colonial relations, leading to modern-day borders of nation-states (Murphy, 2013), power is expressed over a given territory and over a given population. These two elements of capital, human and territory, suggest a physical embodiment to the nation-state. New Media, on another level, has no physical embodiment. Speculation by the Osmo Project (2008) about mapping New Media, so as to physically represent the ‘Geography of Internet Infrastructure’ proved to be a spatial model of network expansions. So to say, the map of New Media is impossible to represent cartographically, but does maintain a certain taxonomy of expansion. Using the Barbasi-Albert model of evolving networks, which was originally designed for the purpose of tracking military communications in the Second World War, Osmo Project represents the expansionary possibilities of the Internet as limitless. The geographies of nation-states remain steady until a phenomenon of upheaval, as opposed to New Media, which expands without physical boundaries. In the discourse of geopolitics, expansion is akin to power gains, because of the increase in territorial and human resources. Unlike geopolitics, New Media assumes no hegemonic desire for power. Given that geopolitics is etymologically relational- given the root of ‘politics’ in the Grecian division of men based on political affiliation- New Media is merely one actor against no others. Why, then, is New Media involved in the discourse of geopolitics, if it is not an inherently power-seeking institution, with no geographical territory, and with anonymity of societal involvement?

Describing the “constellations” of New Media as representative of globalizing forces, senior geopolitical philosopher Jürgen Habermas suggests that the communicative and geographic scope of New Media leads to political fragmentation. Habermas’s conversation about evolving identities and cultures within the nation-state are significant, due to their representation throughout the discovery of the Internet. Habermas recognizes the global forces of New Media as being overwhelmingly powerful of the nation-state; New Media’s transcendence of borders- omnipresence if you will- acts as a “cultural substrate of civil solidarity.” (Habermas, 2001.) Solidarity is used in Habermas’s conversations about changing geopolitical structures, to power lying increasingly in the hands of civil society, rather than with the state. Phenomenal separatisms highlight the increasing volatility of civil society’s solidarity, and are in a direct rebellion to the increased power of the state (Foucault, 1977). From the beginning of nation-state creation, the consolidation of internal power through citizenship and representation within a hegemonic vacuum has likewise increased the state-civil society bond. Foucault’s notion of rebellion in the face of increased power proves that civil society, although identifiable within the nation-state’s borders, begins to fraction. By centralizing the state hegemony, nation-states are disregarding the smaller substrates of civil society. New Media’s representation of these ‘cultural substrates’ encompasses the ability for members of global civil societies to communicate their alterity from the confines of state legibility- citizenship. This formalized understanding of New Media’s pressure on hegemony can be summed as a platform, which allows civil societies to communicate towards solidarity, which effectively fragments the consolidation of state power.

Defining the discourse of geopolitical theory in to the formal (theoretical), practical (implemented) and popular (societal) expertise, historian Paul Routledge has outlined the three analyses of New Media: the formal being the outside speculation, like this essay. The practical, being the regulated state policy regarding New Media. And finally, the popular, being civil society’s use of New Media. It is important to note here, that the popular is not a reaction to the regulation, but is a discourse within itself. Civil society is divided from hegemony of the state through the anonymity of New Media, which allows for the solidarity among actors. Expanding on solidarity as a popular discourse, the predictions of Habermas have become significant in the recent Arab Spring uprisings.

New Media gained an entirely greater geopolitical significance after the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring. University of Washington study, “The Project on Information Technology and Political Islam” (2011) quantifies the New Media traffic of popular democratic expressions leading up to the Tunisian revolution and subsequent Egyptian overthrow of President Mubarak. The study shows that conversations about liberty, democracy and freedom gained almost 80% of total viewership, and the taxonomy of expansion was proven through the civil society’s rebellion going viral between network clusters in just the week before any given Arab Spring uprising. University of Washington’s study is intriguing, because although touted as the ‘Arab Spring’, the uprisings had very little to do with each other. Egyptian feelings of tax oppression and Tunisian desire for furthered reputation did not exist within the same network clusters, yet the New Media usage patterns were parallel.  Leading the study was Professor Phillip Howard, who claimed that it was not a regional movement, but ‘circumstantial evidence of New Media’s ability to insight solidarity.’

More intrinsically, the solidarity of the New Media movement in the Arab Spring was through the creation of online communities and use of forums. Enabling civil society debate to occur outside the sphere of physical interaction within the state, New Media gave rise to less-geographical, more-ideological communities. In an interview with Egyptian friend and colleague, Omar Hagrass, who took part in both the ‘freedom-blogging’ and Egyptian uprisings, the interconnection between separatist groups through New Media was shocking; not only had Egyptian Computer Scientists created network clusters to divert state attention, but the networks created communities among separatists from the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, and the Ulster Nationalist movement in Northern Ireland, United Kingdom. Described by renowned author Benedict Andersen as an ‘imagined community’, the New Media networking done by Egyptian, Mexican and Irish separatists had nothing to do with personal relationships, but instead an imagined kinship in their cause. (1991) Andersen’s prediction of globalized communication as a means to develop a certain consciousness away from that of the traditional nation-state oriented map is congruent with Habermas’s understanding of solidarity between civil society actors as a weakening of the state. New Media becomes a vehicle for shared experience, despite the geopolitical setting.

The anti-geopolitical use of New Media is concurrent to the post-Soviet evolution of geographic theory. Known formally as ‘critical’ or ‘feminist’ geopolitics, the movement for recognition of the intricacies of civil society dominate discourse and shed light on the access to shared experiences. Assuming that the state creation of citizenship creates an empirical definition between one group and another- effectively ‘othering’ them- shows the consolidation of state power in the territorializing of its’ citizens.  This power dynamic is known as the ‘Logic of Alterity,’ which suggests that unified identities are inevitably the hierarchical power. (Isin, 2007. Arendt, 1958.) The Logic of Alterity maintains that subdivision in civil society is seen as ‘wrong’ because of its implied danger to the normative power. The bond between state and civil society consolidations of power are approached monolithically from a macro- to micro-scale. As suggested by New Media’s increased capacity for communication, the state-civil society power is weakened in its normatively unbound allowance for subdivision.

Practically speaking, subdivision in society is increasingly unavoidable with ever-increasing flows of immigration, ideas and innovation. Subdivisions could be ignored, like in the extreme case of fascism, or subdivisions could be embraced under greater state regulation. In the case of the Arab Spring, subdivisions were stifled; New Media was blocked on Internet servers, or Internet itself would be entirely cut off from an area. When this occurred during the Palestinian riots for statehood from Israel in early 2012, the international reaction became an official UN movement towards the ‘Right to Internet Access’. Beginning in 2003, upon the introduction of a knowledge-based economy in Great Britain, the Internet became institutionalized by UN members as a significant expression of freedom. Pressure towards sanctions by the German and French governments (and later acting as leaders in the 2012 vote for Palestinian statehood) depicted a civil society subdivision that was actually favoured by the Social Democratic party leaders. German and French states had seen 8-15% more Palestinian refugees since the upswing in Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the mid-1990s (Human Rights Index, 2005), and despite their non-citizen status of asylum, their voices were clearly present in the decision of French and German ministers to the UN. Despite Palestine having the infrastructural and income capabilities for Internet access, Palestinian refugees were unable to connect to their families in a time of crisis, creating a heightened solidarity around immigrants and New Media discourse.

This hegemonic representation of a non-state civil society is based in the power of New Media itself. As a tool not only for the civil society actors, the state uses New Media to analyze changes in society, which could lead to possible separatism or other fractions of state power. Using New Media as a regulatory mechanism, the German and French governments issued an official Eurobarometer forum on the UN’s ‘Right to Internet Access’ (2011). The Eurobarometer, as the official European Union mediation of member states’ citizens’ feelings towards policy and livelihood, is a vehicle for the maintenance of relations between the state and civil society. The European Union (EU) is a supranational regional power, with a doctrine of supremacy over specific member state policy and is exactly the type of burgeoning power that Foucault described as piquing rebellion (1977). Foucault’s description of heightened power leading to heightened rebellion was a founding anti-geopolitical argument; the European Union stifles rebellion through institutions facilitating power-civil society discourse, such as the Eurobarometer. In fact, in an effort to reduce waste, the EU cut all publically distributed paper materials from its budget- leaving only one vehicle of representative democracy (outside of the national legislatures)- New Media.

Presence of the EU in New Media supersedes any other governmental body, because of it’s expansive “The EU and You” section for forum, information and response. Provided in all 27 recognized European languages, as well as Norwegian, Mandarin, Arabic and Japanese, “The EU and You” is a vehicle of power consolidation through civil society connection (Lister, 2003). This use of New Media by a regional economic hegemony is telling of New Media’s coalescence of communities that that never existed before. If we assume that interest in the EU’s New Media campaign comes from the representative desire from these member states, can we also assume that the representation is being fulfilled?

In the case of Palestinian representation to the UN, Germany and France had already written the ‘Internet as a Human Right’ proposals before the Israeli stripping of Palestine’s Internet access. To this extent, the leading question in the Eurobarometer poll read, “Does freedom to access and contribute to the online community part of your rights to expression?” (personal translation,, 2012). Charged with the vernacular of ‘freedom’, ‘contribution’, ‘community’ and ‘your rights’, the Eurobarometer poll had a suggestive slant towards the affirmative. Upon solicitation of the UN for Internet rights, the EU’s New Media campaign expanded to include open access to textbooks, learning tools for production, and other knowledge-based constructions of European hegemony. Recognizing New Media’s potential for a vehicle of neoliberalism, the EU uses the Internet to distribute ‘Western’ ‘knowledges’ under the guise of open access to information towards a emboldened economy (Cooke, 2004). Nuancing the core-periphery status of nations within and outside of the western ideological constraints, the EU is using New Media to create an ideological hegemony.

New Media’s ability to expand communication across multiple geographical confines is seen as both a tool and threat to state-civil society relationships. Established so far, New Media is a supragovernmental concept, which causes state-civil society distress because of the anonymity of its exponentially increasing character. New Media is also seen as a community-building tool, which can provide democratic reflection on society, amongst a wider group of people. This democracy, though, has established a new ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ structure- beyond that of economic difference, although beginning with it. New Media’s discourse is essentially a Western phenomenon (Cooke, 2004). The Internet, begun by economic forces like any other modern capitalist endeavour, is also perpetuated by economic forces through payment for its access (on a device) and use. The specifics of the Internet’s existence through the capitalist market, and with the largest servers (Cisco Systems) and largest domain providers (Google, Apple, Yahoo!, and others) being traded publically, does New Media exist within a predominant power structure of the economy?

The impact of economic distribution of New Media access, through either personal access or promotional capabilities, creates a symbiosis between civil societies, the state and the outlying force within them- capitalism. New Media presents an epoch to this relationship, though, in its force of mediation between geopolitical economic disputes. In this vein, New Media is a disruptive force to the history of trade war and commoditization of political relations, because of the anonymity of online economic actors. The financial industry, comprising over 85% of the British Gross Domestic Product, is almost entirely mediated by New Media forecasting and broadcasting (Rowe, 2013). Global Stock Exchanges use the medium of New Media to freely express geopolitically important resource abundance and exchange value. Intrinsic relations of the very essential definition of power- resource security (Murphy, 2013) and the power of New Media access have made those who hold it increasingly more powerful than before.

In a World Systems Theory analysis of the access to New Media, author Mark Graham suggests that the ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ economies will no longer be defined by income per capita, but rather by their participation in “democratic, capitalist endeavours” (2011). With a strong New Media bias in favour of the democratic system, which promotes and perpetuates a capitalist society, the ‘core’ expands and the ‘periphery’ becomes now a ‘gap’ (et al.). New Media’s perpetuation of dominant capitalist and Westernized communication has created a perilous ‘gap’ between participating countries- and those who do not subscribe to capitalist or democratic idealism- such as Russia, North Korea and greater Africa. Taken on as a practical policy by the United States’ New Rule Association (2005), the ‘gap’ was described as former President George W. Bush Jr. as a, “threat to democracy”. Could it be, that actually New Media is a threat to states that do not so well mediate their civil societies? Or, is New Media just neoliberalization mechanism that is addressed as transnationally important?

The epoch of New Media symbolizes a change in the discourse about communication, geography and power. As a tool for consolidation of both state and civil society power, and as a mechanism of mediation between the two, New Media allows greater flows of knowledge and communication. New Media does not stand without a greater influence, though. Creating a symbiosis between the geopolitical economic sphere and the civil society representative sphere, New Media allows relations to form beyond the control of hegemonic power, but within the influence of it. As seen by the undertakings of both civil society actors and governments, the influence of New Media is strong upon society, and society’s participation in it gives access to the Western powers of knowledge and capital.


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Hagrass, O. 2012. Interview: Egyptian Uprisings.

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Model European Union 2013; Great Britain Position Paper


Position Paper on a European banking union

The United Kingdom

I. Introduction

The United Kingdom welcomes a discussion of common banking oversight as a key instrument in stabilizing financial relations across the shaken Eurozone. Recent years have painfully exposed the insufficiency of the status quo to protect both the Eurozone from financial crises that engulf its neighbors and partners as well. Yet if substantial steps are necessary, negotiations for a Eurozone banking union must also stress pragmatism and the prudent protection of the diverse interests of all EU Member States. We must focus on concrete measures directly related to strengthening Eurozone financial actors, not rush to unrelated grand initiatives merely to show action against the backdrop of crisis.

II. Background to the British Position

As home to Europe’s largest financial center, with roughly 36% of the EU’s financial business, the United Kingdom has profound interests in financial stability across the continent. Even were our financial concerns not so strong, economic stability in the Eurozone would be of fundamental importance to the British economy because it accounts for 58 per cent of our foreign trade. The UK is in a position to participate in some efforts to respond to these challenges, and may encourage others among Eurozone members. At the same time, it must also safeguard the distinct interests that come from retaining its own currency and relating to its special position in European and global finance.

In its deepest and most long-term elements, Europe’s economic challenge today concerns fiscal policy and debt more than oversight of financial markets. Improved regulatory instruments and practices are desirable, but the reason why oversight and a capacity for correction action is necessary is because banks and governments themselves are awash in debt. The UK confronts its own version of this challenge and is making important progress to reduce spending, control debt, and so reinvigorate growth. As we make the hard choices necessary for a better economic future, it is even more important than in more prosperous times that the EU do nothing to risk that a return to growth. Pragmatic regulatory change and firm national commitments to mastering debt must be the order of the day.

III. Great Britain’s Proposal

The United Kingdom believes that the Council discussions on Banking Union must begin by recognizing a distinction, and indeed a strong separation, between two kinds of proposals advanced by the Presidency. The first group of proposals seeks to endow the Eurozone with a stronger regulatory framework for oversight and crisis support of banks. The United Kingdom welcomes these proposals, agreeing that the Eurozone needs better banking supervision, though they must include better arrangements to safeguard the interests of non-Eurozone EU members.  The second group of proposals suggests new taxes—a VAT increase and a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT)—but offers no clear purpose for raising the EU’s tax burden at this time. The United Kingdom proposes to set aside the Presidency’s ill-considered VAT proposal and perceives important problems with the FTT idea as well. As Europe struggles to escape the deepest recession in living memory, facing painful but necessary cuts in spending to confront unsustainable debts, this is not the time to consider vaguely-justified tax increases that could lead financial firms to leave our continent.

The key addition to the Presidency’s proposals on banking union is to make clear that non-Eurozone member-states will be protected from policies that discriminate against their financial sectors, intentionally or unintentionally, and that decision-making processes allow them input and influence alongside discussions among Eurozone members.

The United Kingdom acknowledges that of the two proposed tax increases, the FTT notion at least has some rationale relating to recent financial challenges. The main purpose of such a tax, as originally developed by economist James Tobin, is not to raise revenue but to deter speculative financial transactions (though of course they also raise revenue). Whatever the merits of this policy in the abstract, it is difficult to implement in the EU setting without bringing more costs than benefits—and especially to the UK. If extended across all of the EU, an FTT will effectively be a tax paid disproportionately in Britain, since so much of European financial activity occurs there. The British contribution to EU coffers will thus rise, absolutely and relative to other countries. Moreover, such a tax could risk London’s place in global finance, encouraging at least some global firms to move to other world centers. If applied only in the Eurozone or a subset of Eurozone members, the FTT will have the same effects on the less robust financial sectors of the participating countries. The United Kingdom would counsel its EU partners not to pursue this option.

Written Supplement; Historical Analysis of the Geographic and Institutional Implications to Economic Development



Varying patterns of development illuminate global inequalities. Measured by the welfare of citizens, ‘development’ is empirically represented by the standard of living in a given nation-state. Originating in 16th century France, development was used to describe the développer, the “unfolding” of centralized cities and expansion of state power. Referring to an increasing spatial-political relationship, development is rooted in understanding welfare as the unfolding of institutional structure within a geographically defined territory. Empirical definition of development is contentious, because it suggests that standards of living are a measurable construct. Applied through a quantitative lens, economic development analyzes the standard of living between national economies. Based in economic growth, economic development suggests the application of resources towards the welfare of citizens- the ‘welfare state’. Through a historical analysis of the ‘welfare state’, economic development is framed as dependent upon empirical geographical and institutional advantages.

What is a Nation?

Europe’s 17th-century rise of nation-states birthed the concept of economic development. French développer of cities gained signification; economic prosperity became institutionalized under the “nation-state”. As a recognized sovereign territory, the nation-state economically integrated cities in to a mercantilist capital accumulation regime. Since the 16th century, the economic doctrine of mercantilism drove the imperial practices of western European powers towards the creation of nation-states. Focus on capital accumulation towards a strengthened central military can be assumed as the first consideration of economic growth. Differing from economic development, economic growth is the measure of domestic production, without heeding to increase in the standards of living. This important difference between ‘growth’ and ‘development’ is illuminated in the mercantilist ideology; the extraction of resources towards the benefit of the central state was not dispersed through social programs, but rather towards the infinite growth of the state. These protectionist policies played the role of early political economy, as mercantilism was an effective tool in strengthening the centralized state. Important to economic development, the birth of the nation-state created a founding institutional centralization of the economy. Despite territorial convergences in later decades, the role of geographic recognition was to create a territorial commonality under a centralized economic institution.

Specific to the 250 years of Mercantilist theory is the concept of extraction. Framed by authors James Robinson and Daron Accemoglu, strong mercantilist nations of Great Britain, France and Spain practiced extractionary politics through colonization. Extraction describes the mercantilist theory of economic growth, described by Acemoglu and Robinson as operating a ‘zero-sum game’, wherein benefit to the state was at a loss to another. Extraction becomes important to economic development of colonized nations, because, unlike the centralized institutions within territorially defined nation-states, colonized nations experienced a decentralized organization of labor, effectively destroying possibilities for a welfare state.[1]


The Role of Inclusive Institutions

Although the idea of economic development was unconceivable in the Mercantilist period, the birth of the centralized nation-state set the institutional and geographic parameters for economic growth, which is essential to economic development. Moreover, Mercantilist economics engaged Western European nations in the forging of institutions through warfare, effectively destabilizing governments and giving rise to labor and unionist movements. Authors Acemoglu and Robinson address this phenomenon as the process of ‘creative destruction’, whereby established power relations are broken and give rise to innovation. Established trade relations, such as the Hudson’s Bay Company, supplemented the changing tide of institutional relationships with the rising economic nationalism. International trade became a vital source of economic growth, while the role of institutions shifted from centralized to representative.

Acemoglu and Robinson organize their book Why Nations Fail around the supremacy of institutional organization in economic development. The premise of this is derived from the Machiavellian persona of Mercantilist nations, whose collapse preceded inclusive institutions, and a ‘virtuous circle’ of economic development. Suggesting that Great Britain’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 was the first step of an institution towards inclusivity, WNF aligns Great Britain’s success in the industrial revolution with redistributed taxation. Beginning with the 1572 Poor Law, British taxation was given a welfare-like status. Unlike welfare, the Poor Law was parochial and redistributed in the form of workhouse care. Tradition of socially-minded taxation allowances were perpetuated through the settlement of Ireland, and transitioned in to lower taxation for plantation land ownership. This increase in land ownership also increased opportunity for profit, growing the middle class. On the other coin, extractive French taxation maintained allowances only for the noble élite, causing disproportionate growth in wealth. Mercantilist economics allowed élite French to hold almost 90% of wealth, and the French could not sustain their wars leading up to the French Revolution from merely taxing 10% of the economy. The burgeoning inclusivity of Great Britain’s institution of taxation exemplifies the ‘virtuous circle’ role that inclusivity has on economic development. The French institution of extractive taxation caused a ‘vicious circle’, resulting in collapse of public finance. Economic nationalism plagued the Western European nations, particularly France, as military spending became unsustainable. The Bourbon Monarchy came to its knees in the face of public upheaval after the dismissal of a land tax proposal in 1776. French élite chose to act in self-interest and maintain extractive taxation, instead of have their lands taxed. Power in the hands of a few resulted in the upheaval by many.

‘Creative Destruction’ of the French Revolution’s power vacuum established governance by multiple ruling classes. Most poignantly, inclusion of the Tiers État, the third class society members, asserted institutional control by the hands of merchants and laborers. Stressing working class issues and trade priorities, the National Constituent Assembly and successive Legislative Assembly involved conflicting interests of the élite and the Tiers État, resulting in the highly symbolic overthrow of the French aristocracy in favor of a Republic. This highly influential succession of institutional development played a significant role in French public policy, under which solidarity was introduced to French governance. Taking the form of a welfare precursor, French solidarity measures were not direct redistribution of government funding to the lower classes, but rather the levying of land tax and restriction of agricultural tax. Allowing the agricultural sector to flourish, while collecting tax from the élite, the French middle class expanded and pushed towards the industrial revolution.

Inclusive taxation institutions grew the middle class in both Mercantilist nation-states of France and Great Britain. In both cases, this allowed investment of both capital and labor to flow from the agrarian sector to the industrial sector, inspiring the industrial revolution. France and Great Britain developed from Mercantilist nation-states in to nationalist production economies, due to changes in the role of institutions as taxation policy.

The Role of Economic Geography

Mobilization of workers was intrinsic to the movement from agrarian society to industrial society. Political geography of France and Great Britain was changing, as demand for labor in to industrial centers encouraged movement from outlying sectors. The role of this geographical transition to economic growth is clear; new industry heightened national production and demanded labor, and the average wage rose, increasing supply of labor. This spatial adjustment of population did increase production and average wage, but had an adverse affect on standards of living. Assumed by economic geographer Paul Krugman to encounter a ‘rent seeking’ ideology, which is unsustainable for economic development, the industrial revolution in Great Britain and France encountered a changing population spatiality, and thereby, an unequal distribution of wages.

First, in discussing the role of geography to Great Britain and France’s economic development, infrastructural developments must be highlighted. Transportation of workers to the industrial centers- the process of urbanization- greatly exaggerated the core-periphery differentiation within nation-states. Still at the forefront of economic growth, and therefore, economic development, France and Great Britain had a cyclical relationship of wanting to attract laborers to the industry, therefore increasing transportation expenditure, and laborers wanting to make higher wages in the industrial sector, therefore increasing transportation innovation (Krugman, 1991). Urbanization effectively created an economy of scale for laborers to participate in, which, like the introduction of small industry to economies of scale, disvalued the labor.

Krugman suggests that under the marginal production theory of income distribution the ‘rental rate’ of a given industry must equal the production value of laborers to maximize profit. So, as industry expands, demand for labor must increase with wages relative to the costs of production. This ‘rent seeking’ ideology is at issue, because in the case of a large supply of labor moving from agrarian to industrial society seeking employment, profit can be maximized by not distributing wages at the ‘rental rate’ equilibrium. Wage inequality is not an institution, because it was not a policy, but is instead the effect of geography by way of population and labor supply. Wage inequality begets the institution of solidarity movements after the transfer of knowledge from the German welfare state.

Economic Growth to Economic Development

Transfer of knowledge between economies is an effect of trade. The impact of the industrial revolution was the increase in demand and supply of labor and goods, because of the heightened middle-class as discussed through the role of institutions. Trade theory, developed significantly after the industrial revolution, explains the nature of trade and its benefit to industrialized economies. Trade theory is important to the role of geography and the role of institutions, as it conceptualizes reasoning for and effect of actualized spatial-political relationships. Trade theory also further explains the intrinsic nature of Mercantilist desire for economic growth, to the beginning of economic development.

Assuming that all actors will act rationally, economic theory always suggests profit-maximizing behavior. Conditioned by Keynesian economics, the gains from trade maximize supply and demand, increasing the opportunity for profit through comparative advantages. The Hecksher-Ohlin model (1933) suggested that even in a situation of absolute advantage, gains from trade were possible due to relative advantages of goods and labor. Relative advantage highlights the disproportionate production possibilities among actors, but does not recognize the disproportionate competition between them. Competition occurs because there is profit-maximizing opportunity in increasing supply, in order to meet the larger demand of trade. With demand increasing through trade, and supply increasing thusly, industries involved in trade will develop increasingly, given that the factors of endowment are also increasing. The Linder hypothesis (1961) shows that competition is essentially dependent on production possibilities, which are dictated by factors of endowment, such as capital, labor, resources and technology. These ‘externalities’ affect growth of industry, creating imperfect competition between actors.

According to Linder, imperfect competition limits the possibilities of trade, because actors with dissimilar factors of endowment are unable to inspire competition in industry. By operating under the assumption that gains from trade are necessary for economic growth, but actors are endowed with different factors, it is reasonable to assume that there are supplementary motivations for trade. The Gravity Model suggests that relative size of economies (their factors of endowment) and relative distance of trade are the contingencies of benefit (Tinbergen, 1962.) Distance of trade is meant to limit transportation costs, similarly to Krugman’s assumption of urbanization as cost saving. Geography’s role in economic growth is shown here- neighboring nations tend to trade with each other.

Tendency to trade with relatively close countries will be analyzed specifically by the parameters of the Gravity Model, to emphasize the process from economic growth to economic development, rather than the socio-political relationships between countries. Although significantly more able to trade due to historical relationships of language and culture, neighboring countries tend to establish trade relations at an institutional level- with underpinnings of geographic spatiality. Coming to a case-in-point, trade relations between Germany and France perfectly represent this Gravity Model, because of their relative distance. Krugman suggests that the geographical relationship supersedes the necessity for relative factors of endowment, and the Linder hypothesis speculates that the syncing of German transportation and industry to the levels of France and French increase in levels of welfare to Germany represents this relationship.

German and French difference in factors of endowment in the industrial revolution must be analyzed first through the difference in institutional arrangement. Present-day Germany did not exist, in that it had not undergone the same pattern of nation-state building as France, due to maintenance of parochial taxation in Germanic territories (Nietzsche, 1885). The reasoning for this 1881 federalization of Germany is speculated as an effect of rising German nationalism, in response to French nationalism and militarization of German territories (Said, 1978), which would correspond to geographic role in synchronization of factors of endowment. Also correspondent, is the upswing in German transportation efforts nearly a century after the industrial revolution began in France and Great Britain. Increasing German nationalism after the Napoleonic Wars threatened German territory began the process of transportation building, especially near the French border and along the Rhein. Germany’s geographic growth in facilitated trade, and the coming of the industrial revolution, under the guise of national protection in warfare.

Learning from France’s regularity in working class institutional change, the development of the German state was based in Otto von Bismarck’s welfare programs. Germany offered the first economic development plan, by learning from the failure of extractive economic growth policies of the French. France, likewise, modeled it’s own welfare program after that of the Germans; policy making in an effort to stabilize the French institutions necessitated working class benefits, because of the severe wage inequality issue due to labor demand and supply. This institutional learning curve is suggested by the Linder hypothesis, because of Germany’s geographical relativity to France. Dialectic of German and French nationalism would soon be overshadowed by the increasing tension over remaining variances in factors of endowment.

Geographic development of infrastructure and institutional development of welfare in the German federation lead to quick expansion in factors of endowment. Coupled with the German access to warfare and industry resources of iron and steel, the French became defensive over the German’s economic development. Political tensions rose and resulted in World Wars I and II, which destroyed both French and German economic development up to that point. Despite the remaining principles in the benefit of a welfare state, when economic growth is depleted like it was due to warfare expenditure, economic development is impossible. Measured empirically by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, ‘economic development’ is a country-based analysis of quality of life (Krugman, 2010). Measuring economic development by GDP per capita aligns all given factors of endowment with the country’s welfare. Maintenance of the welfare state is considered “economic development” because of the definition of welfare within the industrialized Western European countries. After WWII, the concept of foreign aid became related to economic development, as the welfare of Europe gained assistance from the United States’s Marshall Plan for European Recovery.


International Institutions and Economic Development

Politics of development assistance between the United States and Europe did not rest in pleasant diplomatic relations, seeing as world warfare had just cost both sides great deals of money and citizens. Rather, the United States’ interest in European economic development was towards the end of reconstructing the benefit of trade. As the most developed economy next to the United States’, Europeans had a history in purchasing power for traded goods, based on the Gravity Model’s suggestion of relative factors of endowment in industry. Geographical and institutional significance of foreign aid as a means of economic development lies in the globalization of economic growth, and the regionalization of economic development.

Institutionally, the Marshal Plan was significant in it’s ability to suggest peace negotiations among European nations. Instigating the first supranational free trade and common monetary system, the European Recovery Program recognized the tensions between trade barriers, and disregarded the geographically disjointed Europe. The European Union’s force as both an intergovernmental and supranational regime is unique in its configuration, and shares historical commonalities. The successful binding of national economies is fluid in nature, allowing for moderation and stabilization when necessary. With the recent Euro Crisis, this economic unity is threatened by the vacuum of power towards a higher authority, the European Central Bank. Economic development, the process towards increasing welfare, has become a supranational institution, threatening the sovereignty of nations involved. Geographically transcendent, the European Union still maintains tensions between institutional roles of intergovernmental actors.

Shown by the activity of the Development Assistance Committee, international aid is disproportionately decided upon by the 55 wealthiest nations in the world (Ragnar, 1961). The implications of this disproportionate aid include economic development dependence, resulting from the unstable institutions began during the extractionary period of colonization (WNF). Recent global politics suggest that the effect of development assistance created a tertiary extraction regime, whereby trade benefits only the country with greater factors of endowment. Trade between countries with varying factors of endowment can obviously result in tension and warfare, but if the one country is institutionally and geographically disadvantaged, the Linder model fails in applying the logic that it can essentially “scale up” to the factors of endowment of its larger trading partners. Subsumption of smaller economic industry in to economies of scale is represented through trade agreements like NAFTA, suggesting that despite the relativity in distance, the disproportionate factors of endowment negate efficient trade models. Specifically NAFTA represents this issue; the United States, although attempting to boost economic growth of Mexico towards the benefit of its agricultural relative advantage, effectively destroyed welfare of it’s farmers. The cyclical relationship between economic growth and economic development is realized by the downturn in economic growth due to lack of farming development. Farmers, dependent on United State’s investment, are economically unsustainable and suffer severe weaknesses thereby.

Implications of the institution of foreign investment and aid resonate in dependency theory. Unlike the Marshal Plan investment in Europe, which aided the re-growth of economically competent countries, the introduction of small economies with relatively little economic history, to large economies with significant economic competence assumes a sort of dominance of “development” (Ragnar, 1961). Derived from the French concept of the unfolding of political-spatial relationships, is development aid a mechanism of instituting foreign policy? Benefits derived from trade with developed countries are empirically visible in the increase of competition, and the significance of industrial growth to economic development. The role of institutional policy on economic development can be assumed as positive, in it’s responsive nature towards inclusive demands. The role of geography problematizes institutional benefit, because it suggests that a necessary institutional cohesion between geographically different nations, despite their different factors of endowment. Institutional cohesion, as seen on the supranational level of regional free trade agreements NAFTA and the EU, must respect the sovereignty of the country’s policy creation. If policy makers have little experience with economic development and no history in the welfare state, like NAFTA, they can fall in to a ‘vicious circle’ of economic dependence.

Works Cited

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown, 2012. Print.

Krugman, Paul R., and Maurice Obstfeld. Internationale Wirtschaft: Theorie Und Politik Der Außenwirtschaft. München [u.a.: Pearson Studium, 2010. Print.

Krugman, Paul R. Cities in Space: Three Simple Models. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991. Print.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. New York: Modern Library, 1995. Print.

Nurkse, Ragnar (1961). Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. NY: Oxford University Press.

Tinbergen, Jan. Mathematical Models of Economic Growth. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. Print.

[1] This phenomenon of geographic and institutional implications in economic development will be discussed further in relation to foreign aid and economic development.

The United Kingdom’s Acceptance of the Doctrine of Supremacy; Parliamentary Sovereignty in Question

The United Kingdom’s Acceptance of the Doctrine of Supremacy;

Parliamentary Sovereignty in Question




The European Court of Justice maintains a guiding principle of Supremacy. Accepted in both monist and dualist governance structures throughout the European Union, the Doctrine of Supremacy is directly effective in each Member State. In this paper, I will focus on the dualist acceptance of the Doctrine of Supremacy within the British Parliament. Through emphasizing the tradition of British Parliamentary Sovereignty as operating in a duality with the Doctrine of Supremacy, I will frame the ensuing contention within British legislation. By depicting the recognition of the Doctrine of Supremacy as the first step to dualism, I will posit that interpretation of EU Law as the main condition of contention. Through analyzing interpretation of EU law through the scope of it’s judicial application, I will establish that dualism exists due to continued British Parliamentary Sovereignty. I will then critically analyze the system of dualism in its theoretical relationship to the concept of a European Grundnorm, and its legislative feasibility for continued British Parliamentary Sovereignty.



Accession of the United Kingdom to the European Union under the European Communities Act of 1972 subordinated British legislation, by making European legislation “enforced, allowed and followed.”[1] The ECA negotiated supranational power to the European Court of Justice through ratification of the British Parliament[2]. By accepting the ECJ as a regulatory body[3], the ECA made traditional British Parliamentary Sovereignty problematic, by establishing Union law as secondary legislation[4] on any “legal proceedings… to the effect of the [Community] Treaties.”[5] Given section 2(2) of the ECA, wherein the United Kingdom courts must recognize, interpret and apply the European Union Treaties within national courts, how has traditional British Parliamentary Sovereignty accepted the “new legal order”[6] of the EU’s Supremacy Doctrine?

Without a codified constitution, the UK allows Parliamentary Sovereignty in all legal matters[7]. Ultimate legal power of the UK Parliament is at odds with supremacy of EU law, because of the primacy they both imply. Parliamentary Sovereignty necessitated Parliament’s ratification the ECA, making the powers of the EU’s Doctrine of Supremacy contingent upon Parliamentary legislation. Therefore, Parliamentary Sovereignty is reified as “continued sovereignty”[8] under the ECA, due to the power for Parliament to withdraw from the Union at will[9]. Foundation for continued sovereignty of British Parliament lies in the recognition, interpretation and application of the duality of power implied in the UK relationship with the EU. The UK operates under a system of dualist governance, respecting both UK and EU powers, in order to solve the problem of British acceptance of the EU’s Supremacy Doctrine.

Dualist Governance and Acceptance of the Supremacy Doctrine

A system of dualism involves a two-stage process of legislation. In the context of EU and UK relations, the dualism rests between the Doctrine of Supremacy, which allows UK citizens to enjoy EU rights, and the UK Parliamentary Sovereignty, which allows the UK to remain in power of all legislation. These two competing hierarchies maintain a dual relationship in respect to legislation, in that they both have binding power. Sectoral convergence to Union Treaty articles establishes a growing range of legislature to which the Doctrine of Supremacy applies. In this fluidity of Union regionalization, the UK has confirmed Parliamentary Sovereignty through recognition of integration of EU law through Parliament, application of EU law by national courts under the jurisdiction of Parliament and interpretation of EU law through Parliament-established judicial order.


UK Parliament Perspective

The principle nature of EU law, known as the Doctrine of Supremacy, is recognized by the UK as legitimate[10], is applied by Parliament[11] and is effective through interpretation by British courts[12] is considered to exist in a duality of power with the British Parliament, because of Parliament’s regulatory power to withdraw from the Union[13]. This Parliamentary control over the relationship of the Doctrine of Supremacy is known as “continued sovereignty”[14]. It is the basic argument of the tradition of Parliamentary Supremacy, in relation to international treaties and principles, like the Doctrine of Supremacy[15]. Dualism arises from this argument, as the recognition, integration and application of the treaty within a sovereign legislature.


European Court of Justice Perspective

Through a historical precedence, establishing the Doctrine of Supremacy in EU law, the ECJ set out three conditions, whereby variance in interpretations of prevailing law are resolved: First, that contentious national law becomes “automatically inapplicable”[16] upon Community law’s entrance in to force.[17]; Second, that Community law cannot be interrogated by national courts[18]; Third, that citizens and corporations may enjoy Community law rights within national courts[19]. The ECJ uses these conditions to impose supranational governance- the Doctrine of Supremacy.

The UK parallels these interpretations of the Doctrine of Supremacy in a system of dualism, which harmonizes EU law and the UK Parliament. Dualism is established because of recognition of competing supremacies within UK governance[20], which are resolved through interpretation of Supremacy by the UK Parliament[21], and the application of EU law in areas of UK Parliamentary contention[22].


Recognition of Competing Supremacies

After the ratification of the European Communities Act in 1972, and accession to the European Union in 1973[23], the Case of Bulmer v. Bollinger (1974) gave clarification[24] to the scope of problems the UK faced in accepting the Doctrine of Supremacy. Lord Denning famously stated,

The Treaty is quite unlike any of the enactments to which we have become accustomed … It lays down general principles. It expresses its aim and purposes. … But it lacks precision. It uses words and phrases without defining what they mean. A British lawyer would look for an interpretation clause, but he would look in vain.”[25]

By accepting the Doctrine of Supremacy under dualist governance with Parliamentary Sovereignty, the problem of interpretation is posited. How does a polity operate, given the necessity to interpret laws from other powers? Lord Denning continues on,

“What are the British courts to do when they are faced with a problem of interpretation? They must follow the European pattern… They must look to the purpose and intent … They must divine the spirit of the Treaty and gain inspiration from it. If they find a gap, they must fill it as best they can.”[26]

As defined stare decisis by the ECJ, the UK’s “problem of interpretation,” must be resolved through eliminating variance in of Community law. Lord Denning understands this resolution as a movement towards acceptance of EU Law, and posits an understanding by the British, in order to interpret EU law. Bulmer v. Bollinger therefore defines the manner in which the UK accepts the Doctrine of Supremacy upon ratification of the ECA; British courts must recognize principles of EU law, in light of British tradition. Bulmer v. Bollinger differentiates the areas of the Supremacy Doctrine’s competence from the direct effectiveness of that law within the British polity. This differentiation recognizes a dualist balance in the problem of interpreting EU law.

Application of the Doctrine of Supremacy

The UK Parliament allows EU law to be directly effective within national court legislation. In this sense, recognition of the Doctrine of Supremacy under the tradition of Parliamentary Supremacy leads to the application of EU law to provisional legislation. Contention between EU law and UK Acts of Parliament are reified by the relationship of dualism, which can be seen as established through the application of both the Doctrine of Supremacy and Parliamentary Sovereignty in the case of Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport [27]. Factortame questioned the UK’s legislation, which cited an Act established by the same Parliament[28] as its legal basis. Despite the citation of an Act of Parliament, the ECJ ruled against the House of Lords legislation, which directly violated the tradition of Parliamentary Sovereignty as explained by Albert VennDicey,

No person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”[29]

Through the primacy of ECJ legislation granting interim relief, this case became definitive of the Doctrine of Supremacy’s powers against the will of Parliament. In this case, Lord Goff notably says that, “As a matter of Community law, interim relief had to be available in principle against the Crown.”[30]

The ECJ ruled in accordance with the ECJ ruling that contentious law becomes inapplicable under the Doctrine of Supremacy[31], and the Supreme Court Act of 1981. The Supreme Court Act of 1981 established in the case of Factortame, that the British Parliament had not correctly interpreted the EU Directive when making the legislation preempting the decision of Factortame. By defining the extent to which the Doctrine of Supremacy could alter a decision by Parliament, Factortame did not further restrict Parliamentary Sovereignty beyond the reification of the ECA.

Parliamentary Sovereignty was maintained on a dualistic level to the Doctrine of Supremacy, in that the interpretation of EU Law was at issue. Dualism in application of the Doctrine of Supremacy stands a questionable forefront in Factortame, because of the removal of an Act of Parliament. Dualism is confirmed in Factortame because the ECJ interprets the application of the Doctrine of Supremacy as a remedy mechanism for such variances in interpretation[32]. The Doctrine of Supremacy is therefore contextually applied within the ECA, under the British Parliament’s sovereign power.

Interpretation of the Doctrine of Supremacy

Through a disambiguation in the application process for EU law in British courts, the Factortame proceedings illuminate the Doctrine of Supremacy’s force upon UK legislation, and also the duality of interpretation between the ECJ and the UK Parliament. Specified under the ECA section 3(1), interpretation of the EU Treaty law must be done within the UK courts, or referred through Article 267 Treaty of the Functioning European Union to the ECJ. The ECA sets precedence for interpretation by the national courts, in light of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, which encourages harmonization of interpretation of EU law among all member states.

Unlike the interpretive procedures established and adjusted since Factortame, the Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council[33] case posits a question of Parliamentary Supremacy in the interpretive process. In the case of Thoburn, the European Charter on Human Rights was put in to question, as a determination of biased judicial proceedings regarding the application for appeal to the ECJ. Despite Thoburn appeal to the ECJ, claiming his referential rights had been violated, the ECJ did not make jurisdiction on the case of Thoburn, leaving the UK jurisdiction to be sovereign.  Stated by victorious party, the Sunderland City Council,

EU law should be seen as having been entrenched, rather than merely incorporated, into domestic law, by virtue of a principle of EU law which was independent of constitutional principles of national law, such as dualism.”[34]

This case represents the struggle of duality between UK Parliament’s sovereignty to interpret EU law under the Doctrine of Supremacy. The Doctrine of Supremacy was not applied to the interpretation in Thoburn, because of the EU’s Principle of Legal Certainty. This Principle is inherent to the operation of dualism in the UK, because it grants confidence to the national courts, unless “It appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been adopted with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving any end other than those stated.”[35]

In response to clarification in Factortame of the interpretive power of the judicial officer and House of Lords, and the assumptions in Thoburn about the judicial bias towards UK Parliamentary Sovereignty, the ECHR contended that the UK did not sufficiently separate powers for interpretation of EU law[36][37]. In an effort to divorce the possibility of biased elections for a judiciary board for interpretation of EU law, the UK passed the Constitutional Reform Act in 2005[38]. Through creating an independent judiciary[39], a new Supreme Court[40] and a new system for the appointment of judges[41], the CRA restructured the judicial pattern for interpretation of EU law.

By ushering in a separation of powers, the UK maintains its duality through substantialzing the judicial interpretation methods under EU law. The Doctrine of Supremacy is adhered to, without a change in the Parliamentary make-up. Judicial institutions, which support Acts of Parliament, are acting on behest of Parliament’s will to follow the ECA. With extensive interpretive power given to the judicial system, and a set of common laws that the ECHA sets out under the Human Rights Act of 1998, the question of continued sovereignty of Parliament is posited.

Continued Sovereignty and Dualist Governance in the United Kingdom


In the case of Pickin v. British Railways Board[42],  the UK defines the purpose of Parliamentary Sovereignty, in a context of it’s validity within British legislation. Through initially defining the British tradition of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Pickin sought to define which body within the British polity, be it the House of Lords or the Parliament itself, should interpret a body of law for the purpose of application. Citing the Act of Parliament in 1911[43]and the subsequent Interpretation Act of 1978[44], Pickin established that Parliamentary acts cannot be questioned by the House of Lords, but can be interpreted through them. This interpretation procedure gave rise to the idea that, without a referential procedure from the courts to Parliament, the British courts must rely on a sort of European Union Grundnorm[45]. Recognition of a European Grundnorm would inherently restrict Parliamentary Sovereignty, because of its directly effective nature[46], without legislation through Parliament.

In an effort to alleviate this contention between interpretation by the courts and continued sovereignty, the EU Bill became an Act of Parliament on 19 July 2011,. The EU Bill sought to legalize the political agenda of dualism, and establish a referential procedure from the UK courts towards Parliament, in order to avoid a divergence towards the formation of EU law as Grundnorm, Primacy of EU law in this sense would negate Parliamentary Sovereignty of the UK, as explained by Pickins v. British Railways Board. Clause 18 of the EU Bill legitimizes dualist governance within the United Kingdom, which seeks to affirm Parliamentary Sovereignty, by acknowledging that the UK allows EU law to operate within it. Citing the case of Thoburn[47], in which it is made clear that EU law takes affect through an Act of Parliament, the EU Bill affirms UK dualism.

“Status of EU law dependent on continuing statutory basis:

By virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 directly applicable or directly effective EU law (that is, the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures referred to in section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972) falls to be recognized and available in law in the United Kingdom.”[48]

Debate surrounding Clause 18 of the EU Bill, known as the ‘Duality Clause’[49], cites the legal inapplicability of the EU Bill to any further governance beyond the current Parliament. Dualism is also called in to question by the European Scrutiny Committee Report of 2011, when suggested that the EU Bill is itself binding Parliamentary Sovereignty, by restricting the future Parliaments to dualist governance. This would undermine the tradition of Parliamentary Sovereignty, as historically defined by Albert Venn Dicey, in that “Parliament is not bound by its predecessor.”[50] In response, the UK Government stated that the case for dualism is made merely in hope that “the Bill becomes part of the accepted constitutional framework of this country.”[51]




Attempts to establish a system of dualism undergo scrutiny from angles of its theoretical validity in relation to European Grundnorms, and its legal feasibility in becoming a British Parliamentary Tradition. Since the recognition of EU law in British legislation through the ECA, the UK has accepted the Doctrine of Supremacy through a means of dualist governance between it and the Parliament. Dualism is established through the continued sovereignty of UK Parliament, by way of recognition of the Doctrine of Supremacy, and then the application and interpretation of the Doctrine via British Parliament. Acceptance of the Doctrine of Supremacy by the UK through dualism creates a disjointed nature in interpretation of EU law, but maintains validity under continuous judicial reforms.


Arangonés, Jay. “Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame Ltd.: The :Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Community Law.” Fordham International Law Journal 14.3 (1990): 778-819. Print.

Dicey, Albert Venn. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London: Macmillan, 1959. Print.

Craig, Paul. “Britain in the European Union.” The Changing Constitution. Ed. Jeffrey L. Jowell and Dawn Oliver. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 92. Print.

Jowell, The Rule of Law Today, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 19 (J. Jowell & D. Oliver eds. 1989).

Kaczorowsky, Alina (2008). European Union law. Taylor & Francis. pp. 232. ISBN 978-0-415-44797-3.

Lakin, Stuart (2008). “Debunking the idea of parliamentary sovereignty: the controlling factor of legality in the British constitution”. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press)

McAuslan, Patrick, and John F. McEldowney. Law, Legitimacy, and the Constitution: Essays Marking the Centenary of Dicey’s Law of the Constitution. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985. Print.

“Official Journal of the European Union.” EUR-Lex. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Nov. 2012.

T. Allan, “Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning´s Dexterous Revolution” (1983)

“The EU Bill and Parliamentary Sovereignty” European Scrutiny Committee. 2011. Section 6 (72)

Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, [1955] CAMBRIDGE L.J.,

Winterton, G, ‘The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined’ ( 1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 591-617.

Statutes Cited

Act of Parliament. 1911. Section 3

Constituttional Reform Act. 2005. Sections 1, 3, 4.

ECHR. 2005. Article 6.

European Communities Act. 1972. Sections 1, 2, 3.

Merchant Shipping Act. 1988.

The EU Bill. 2011. All Sections.

The Interpretation Act.1978. Section 22(1).

UK Accession Treaty. 1972

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1980. Vol. 1155, p. 331


Cases Cited

Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal. 1977.

Bulmer v. Bollinger. 1974.

Costa v. ENEL. 1964.

Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] : 2 [1991] : No3 [1992] : 4 [1996] : 5 [1999]

MacCarthys v Smith. 1981.

NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Ondernem- ing van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. 1962.

Pickin v British Railways Board. 1974.

Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council. 2002.

[1] European Communities Act 1972 S 1(2)

[2] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1980. Vol. 1155, p. 331

[3] ECA 1972 S 1(2)

[4] ECA 1972 2(2)

[5] ECA 1972 3(1): [Community] added for clarification purposes.

[6] “Official Journal of the European Union.” EUR-Lex. Article 220. Web. 20 Nov. 2012.

[7] Dicey, Albert Venn. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London: Macmillan, 1959. Print.

[8] Craig, Paul. “Britain in the European Union.” The Changing Constitution. Ed. Jeffrey L. Jowell and Dawn Oliver. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Print. pp. 96

[9] ibid.

[10] ECA 1972 S 1(2)

[11] The EU Bill. 2011. Para. 73

[12]Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport.

[13] The EU Bill. 2011. Para. 73

[14] Dicey, Albert Venn. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London: Macmillan, 1959. Print.

[15] MacCarthys v Smith. 1981.

[16] Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal. 1977.

[17] ibid.

[18] Costa v. ENEL. 1964.

[19] NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Ondernem- ing van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. 1962.


[20] Bulmer v. Bollinger. 1974.

[21]MacCarthys v Smith. 1981.

[22]Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport.

[23] UK Accession Treaty. 1972.

[24] T. Allan, “Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning´s Dexterous Revolution” (1983)

[25] Bulmer v. Bollinger. 1974.Ch. 401.

[26] ibid.

[27] Factortame Ltd  v Secretary of State for Transport.

[28] Merchant Shipping Act 1988

[29] Dicey, Albert Venn. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London: Macmillan, 1959. Print.

[30] Arangonés, Jay. “Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame Ltd.: The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Community Law.” Fordham International Law Journal 14.3 (1990): 778-819. Print.

[31] Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal. 1977.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council. 2002.

[34] “The EU Bill and Parliamentary Sovereignty” European Scrutiny Committee. 2011. Section 6 (72)

[35] Kaczorowsky, Alina (2008). European Union law. Taylor & Francis. pp. 232.

[36] ECHR. 2005. Article 6 (paragraph 1)

[37] “UK Regulatory Materials Summaries” Strategic Research Unit. 1991. European Law Society.

[38] Constituttional Reform Act. 2005.

[39] ibid. Section 1.

[40] ibid. Section 3.

[41] Ibid. Section 4(2)

[42] Pickin v British Railways Board. 1974.

[43] Act of Parliament. 1911. Section 3

[44] The Interpretation Act.1978. Section 22(1).

[45] Craig, Paul. “Britain in the European Union.” The Changing Constitution. Ed. Jeffrey L. Jowell and Dawn Oliver. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 92. Print.: Grundnorm is equivilant to British Common Law, as presented by Craig.

[46] Factortame Ltd (1) v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] : 2 [1991] : No3 [1992] : 4 [1996] : 5 [1999]

[47] The EU Bill. 2011. Para. 73

[48] The EU Bill. 2011. Clause 18.

[49] “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.” Andrew Duff.  21 October 2011. The Financial Times.

[50] Dicey, Albert Venn. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London: Macmillan, 1959. Print.

The Kurdish Question


This is a strictly academic post, for a term paper about development in the “Muslim” world. I feel very strongly about the Turkish position in modern day society, as they are the gateway between the east and the west, as well as an Islamic society that has successfully chosen capitalism and is attempting democracy. I highlighted the plight of the Kurdish, because it is Turkey’s most poorly managed developmental struggle. It’s also fascinating, that a population as large as the Kurdish, has no nation. In this group, they are also; internationally active, freaking NOMADIC and oppressed. The Kurdish are both diverse, and culturally intriguing. Oh, and they are beautiful. Bright green eyes and soft light brown skin? To die for. Enjoy!

The Kurdish Question

On 28 June 1925, the Sheikh Said Rebellion instigated what was to be one of the most multifaceted nationalist movements in the Middle East. Almost 80 years later, this mobilization of Kurdish separatists against the oppressive Republic of Turkey continues as an unresolved armed conflict. The Kurdish separatist struggle for autonomy evolved in to what is now known as the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK). 30 years and 40,000 deaths later, Turk military and the PKK have both accused of human rights violations by the Council of European Union. Despite financial sanctioning for Turkey, and labeling of the PKK at a ‘terrorist organization,’ discourse to promote peaceful relations was never encouraged, nor attempted. Both Turkish and Kurdish societies denied opportunities to establish open dialogue with each other, or through an intermediary during periods of cease-fire. Such dialogue would have addressed the very multifaceted conflict between the threatened state of Turkey and the oppressed Kurdish culture, and the insurgency of the PKK. Tempers between these groups grew past political objectives, and became cultural terrorist attacks on personal freedoms. Thusly, the Turkish culture’s demonization of the Kurdish, only fueled the hatred of the insurgent PKK. Grouping both the Kurdish people and the Kurdish insurgents together, the Turkish condemned the Kurdish and established the ‘Kurdish Question,’ referring to political efforts to expel Kurdish peoples from the nation. Through analysis of related theoretical texts covering modernity and cultural miscommunication, the ‘Kurdish Question’ will be given a framework by which discrimination can be minimized and cultural communication will be effective.

The framework of the ‘Kurdish Question’, pragmatically speaking, depends on several factors. First, effective cultural discourse must establish differences. In contrast to James Carey’s A Cultural Approach to Communication, it is important to acknowledge ‘otherness,’ thereby eliminating expectations for similarities. Edgar Schein’s study on sub-cultural communication agrees, stating, “speaking the same language creates a greater risk that people will overlook the actual differences in categories of thought that reflect functional subcultures.” (1993) Through a historical pre-text, origins of the Turkish, Kurdish and the PKK’s ideological convictions can deconstruct presumptions, allowing for greater understanding of ideological background. 
Secondly, the Turkish state must recognize that the ‘Kurdish Question’ is distinct from the PKK’s terrorism. From this re-estimation of Kurdish culture, it becomes obvious that Kurdish culture and Kurdish activism have two different intentions pertaining to the state of Turkey. Recognition that the oppression of the Kurdish peoples for the sake of PKK repulsion is wrong and has been historically inhumane. In reference to Stuart Hall’s Question of Cultural Identity, cultural identity isn’t fixed amongst a group, and collective identity is an ‘unstable point of identification.’ (324) Analysis of Kurdish livelihood under Turkish rule can provide points of miscommunication and mistreatment, to prevent such further atrocities. 
Third, both the initial two steps will frame a rounded cultural perspective, which will increase ability to address the horrible miscommunications between the three major actors. The ‘Kurdish Question’ includes two very defined political persuasions, Islamic Orientalism and Turkish Kemalism. Manuel Castells (1997) expresses the importance of identity when looking at political frameworks, stating that identity is relational to the role it is occupying. Castell’s three types of identities can be used to describe the positional power relationship between Turkey, the Kurdish culture and the PKK. Organizing each actor in to an identity will provide a theoreticalf framework for addressing the cultural miscommunications. It is essential for modernized Turkey to communicate with the two periphery ideologies, the Kurds and the PKK,  and relieve the negative connotation  of ‘Kurdish Question’. Having won the war, Turkey now needs to win the peace.

29 October 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became the first non-Ottoman ruler in over 623 years of Turkish history (Cornell, 2001; 32). Preempted by the First World War, Turkish Nationalists were ready for Revolution. After a successful Turkish War of Independence, Nationalists sought to remove the socio-political legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The nationalist and secularist reforms signified the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation-state and from Islam to nationalism, with the “cult of Atatürk” substituting Islam as “Turkey’s religion” (Müller, 1996: 175). The Hat Law of 1825, prohibiting the veil and the fez, was the first step to declassification of Turkey under ‘Orientalist’ standards. Kemal Atatürk’s Nationalism removed Islam as the cohesive element of Turkey; instead he instigated ‘Turkification’. Atatürk viewed ethno-religious pluralism as a problem with the Ottoman empire, and was convinced that a nation could only consist of a society that shared the same ideal, language, territory and culture. Influenced by Western modernity and superiority, Turkification became Kemalism’s action plan for Turkey.

Tek dil, tek halk, tek bayrak’
One language, One people, One Flag

Although Atatürk emphasized the, “inseparability of the Kurds from the Ottoman nation,” (Muller, 1996: 176), he signed the “Treaty of Lausanne” of July 24th 1923, prohibiting Kurds from claiming Kurdistan as a sovereign state. After the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the passing of “Settlement Law” (1934 ) displayed Atatürk’s dismissal of the Kurdish from his ‘Turkified’ nation. Dividing Kurds in to acceptable “zones,” Article 11 of the law ordered Kurds to be distributed thinly so that they constituted no more than 10 percent of the population of any district to which they were sent. There was no thought given to Kurdish family homes, or family units. (Muller, 1996: 178). 
Understanding the de/territorialization of Kurds cannot be done on with respects to globalization, as presented by Inda and Rosaldo. The de/territorialization experienced by the Kurds is an on going process, with the possibility of the average Kurd getting ‘uprooted’ three times or more in one lifetime. (Amnesty International, 2007.) As societies around the Middle East push them out, the Kurdish peoples have a large Diaspora population in many Northern European societies. Unfortunately, the plight of the Kurds left in Turkey is extreme. With a lack of economic stimulus from the government, they live off the land, with very few opportunities for education or personal initiative outside of their tribe. Amnesty International states, “Kurdish is the largest ethnicity without a nation, at an estimated 35 million people, and at least an extra 1 million living in Diaspora.” (2007) 
While the Arabs call the Kurds “Arabs from Yemen”, the Turks call them “mountain Turks” and the Persians regard them as their ethnic counterparts, it is not astonishing that the Kurdish have suffered with tensions about their cultural identities! Kurds represent a group that has been ‘Orientalized’ and outcasted by modernized communities of its homeland, with the only evidence as to why being that a majority practice fundamental Islam.
Currently, the Turkish constitution doesn’t allow Kurdish television, Kurdish language instruction, formation of political groups with the word ‘Kurdish’ in them, or anything else that could, “provoke hatred or animosity between groups,” unless permitted by the state. (Consitution of the Republic of Turkey) Such stringent media and expression laws are very parallel with that of ‘Thought Crime,’ in George Orwell’s 1984. When the government outcasts it’s own citizens, ‘Orientalizing’ them, labeling them as not as in some way not up-to –par, it’s only a matter of time before the citizens realize that they can build their own golf course. Kurdish autonomy is not an impossibility.

‘Ne mutlu Türküm digene.’ How happy is the one who says, I am a Turk.

Orientalism, as used by Edward Said (1978), referred to hegemonic patterns of representation of “Oriental” cultures and societies as “backward” and “traditional” in order to construct Europe (or the West) as “modern” and “progressive.” For this reason the Orient had to constantly be stigmatised and set apart as innately different from the Occident. This ‘othering’ process of drawing a strict East/West boundary became “The starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind’, destiny, and so on” (1978). Orientalist images and knowledge, generated alongside colonialism in the 18th and 19th centuries, have operated as a tool and a justification of Western cultural, political, military and economic dominance, based on the perception of the inferiority of non-Western cultures, religions and societies. This understanding of Orientalism connects cultural, political and economic power relations and the hegemony of Turkey.

By assuming the Orientalist narrative and re-enacting it in the form of a Turkish Orientalism “indigenous” to Turkey, the Turkish ruling elite negated the Ottoman past for its “backwardness” and “religiosity”. The Kemalists rejected the Orient and assigned to Islam the definition of Orientalness, thus equating ‘westernisation’ with de-Islamisation. The process of the reproduction of Orientalism within Turkey refers to the way in which the Turkish nationalist elite, the Kemalists, imagined the Turkish nation and construed the ethno-religiously diverse society inherited from the Ottoman Empire. It is the process whereby Kemalism approached the society it emerged from, and the conditions that gave rise to it, through an Orientalist and Eurocentric reasoning and logic. Since Western modernity, superiority and strength was defined by homogenous nation-statehood and militarism, systematic Turkification became Kemalism’s very own civilizing mission. How do the missions of with the Kurdish demand for freedoms fit in with Atatürk’s ‘Turkification’?

“People cannot develop if they don’t conquer social dignity.” 
(Castells, 25; 1997)

Castells offers an identity organizational structure that would be able to further explain relationships between Kurdish identity, and the exertion of Turkish power on their livelihood. Unlike “roles” (i.e. ‘Mother’), which are defined by “norms structured by the institutions and organizations of society,”(27; 1997) identities (i.e. gay, feminist), “are sources of meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation” (1997) ‘Legitimizing identity’ is “introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination vis-à-vis social actors.”(1997) An example is the identity of citizen confined to political actions within the limits of established state power. The Republic of Turkey would fit in to this category, because they are aware and content with their relationship with power (they are the power). ‘Resistance identity’ is “generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination…”(1997) The Resistance identity emphasizes disagreement and contest of the power, but no action for change. This group is the oppressed minority. ‘Resistance identity,’ of the Kurd can be exemplified with their ‘otherness’ from the state through religious fundamentalism, and their unwillingness to appreciate Turkish modernity. “Exclusion of the excluders by the excluded.”(1997) Finally, although rare, ‘Project identity’ is the identity of reformation. No longer did they want to be oppressed and hold only political grudges, they wanted to take social action. Social tension like this is established in the PKK identity. 
Castells identities can also be separated in to the specific interests of each group. The Republic of Turkey is ‘legitimate,’ and wants to maintain their specific relationship with power. Kurdish citizens ‘resist,’ by having internalized feelings against the power above them. They are the minority that wants to be heard. Finally, the PKK has a ‘project.’ Contending with the ‘legitimate’ power of Turkey, the PKK has interest in extreme change in things like social and economic policy.

“If the Kurdish issue is resolved in a democratic way through dialogue we will lay down our weapons, yes. We will not carry arms,”Murat Karayilan, current leader of the PKK (2010)

With the PKK militarily accepting peace offers from the Turkish, the time has come for Turkey to accelerate its democratization, including the removal of restrictions on cultural rights. Turkey has opposed any easing of its strict legislation over terrorism, freedom of expression, and cultural rights, and justifies its position with the argument that reform would imply ‘concessions’ to terrorists. Now that the specter of PKK terrorism has significantly diminished, opportunity has emerged for the country to go forward with reforms on human rights and democratization. Interests of both the ‘legitimate’ Turks to maintain identity, and the PKK to instigate a ‘project’ of change for themselves and the minority, are transparent for negotiations. Now, one must contend about how to establish agreement between the two feuding sides.

Convergence theories argue that despite national and regional differences, the road to modernization is basically unilinear. Frances Fukuyama, in his widely read book, The End of History, extends the unilinear view of modernization to argue that an inevitable outcome of global conflict is political democratization. He argues that human history can be seen as a “coherent development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery through various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal aristocracies, up through modern liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism.” (xii) Fukuyama would be suggesting in this sense, that Kurdish culture will inevitably be de-feudalized and accept the democratic concept of secularization. Fukuyama recognizes that nations and peoples can choose to resist these forces of history, but in a kind of Darwinian evolution, those who resist will eventually be ‘swept away,’ or at least overshadowed, by those that evolve in the ‘prescribed’ direction.

Of course, the unilinear view of modernization has often been challenged, particularly in the non-western world, but also by western scholars. In contrast to convergence theories like Fukuyama’s, are theories of cultural variation, which assert there are different roads to modernization and different end states to the modernization process. This contends that, despite possible democratization of Turkey, Kurdish ideological differences will continue to cause conflict. One of the most straightforward and articulate spokesmen of the cultural variation school is Samuel Huntington. In a widely read essay, “Clash of Civilizations?” and a subsequent book, Foreign Affairs, Huntington argues that while all cultures experience certain similarities in the modernization process, cultures still retain their unique characteristics and basic ideologies. Even after modernization, societies can be quite different from each other.

Who has the better of this debate, Huntington or Fukuyama? The central question is whether all modernizing societies are approaching the same end state, including political democracy, or whether the distinct legacies and traditions of different civilizations mean that they will remain separate and unique.

In application to the Kurdish Question, Fukuyama is wrong and Huntington is right. Just as important as the continual pressure to modernize, is the continual pressure to maintain cultural traditions and values. The Kurdish Question has shown the persistent power of anti-secular (and therefore anti-Western) culture and ethnicity. Symbolizing the ethnic and national rivalries that fuels wars, and acting as an example of a significant fault line in the Middle East, ‘the Turkish-Kurdish conflict proves that blood and soil have proven powerful attachments.’(Öcalan, 2003)

The evolution of Turkish politics and society can be promoted through encouragement of civil society and the welcoming of outside agencies (NGOs) to facilitate discussion. Such organizations have the best chance of offering public discourse without forced presence in Kurdish areas. In this context, the role of Kurdish political parties deserves mention. Most Kurdishoriented parties in the 1990s have been closed by the Constitutional Court due to links to the PKK. Currently, the People’s Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi–HADEP) is under the same threat. However, the results of the 1999 general elections indicate the wide popularity of HADEP in the southeast. Although the party received only 4.7 percent of the total votes in the parliamentary election, small amount is largely related to the 10 percent representation in the parliament. With little chance of attaining that level nationwide, many voters concluded that a vote for HADEP was ‘wasted’(2005.)
Results in the simultaneous elections suggested differently. In many towns in the southeast, including the large cities of Van and Diyarbakir, HADEP candidates won landslide victories with up to 70 percent of the vote. This is a clear sign that large parts of the population of the southeast strongly favor a democratic representative of Kurdish rights. State attempts to destroy HADEP, either by closing down the party through legal measures or through the harassment or arrest of its leaders, are thus likely to be counterproductive. Removing the possibility of a democratic outlet for Kurdish sentiment will only fuel new rebellions. Despite its sometimes-warranted suspicions, the state needs to tolerate and, if possible, engage HADEP and other democratic Kurdish movements instead of suppressing them.

Encouraging the use of open dialogue, transparency by the state in economic funding, and reformation of the Turkish’s Republic’s constitution is the first-ever leader, and now prisoner of the state, Aduhllah Öcalan. “Confronted by aggressive national chauvinism… if the power was explained, there would be no ideological constraints to agreement with the state.” (2008) Encouraging the discrimination of ethnic hegemony, and the institution of democratic socialism, Öcalan suggests that the ‘Kurdish Question’ should be treated as a fundamental question of democracy.

Turkish interests stand against democracy, because of the still discriminatory view of ‘otherness’.  Through open dialogue, could the Turks not achieve a more hegemonized Kurdish population? Other proponents of this theory include current Turkish President, M. Fethullah Gülen. Currently engaged in a  “war of position,” Gülen states that societal change must trickle through a society’s ‘superstructure,’(Hendrick,  2009) Through recognizing the power structures through Castell’s identities, opening historical dialogue to condition society to understand, and taking advantage of current PKK and Turkish leadership, the ‘Kurdish Question’ will evolve from expressing political hegemony, to accessing the social hegemony potential of the Republic of Turkey, the Kurdish citizens, and the radical PKK.

“Only after strengthening one’s collective identity, therefore, can actors in a network make use of the ‘structural connection’ between institution and individuals.”

Hendrick, 2009.

Works Cited

Abrahamian, Ervand. “The US Media, Huntington and September 11.” Third World Quarterly 24.3 (2003): 529-44. Print.

Öcalan, Abdullah. War and Peace in Kurdistan; Perspectives for a Political Solution to the Kurdish Question. International Initiative, 2009. Print.

Canefe, Nergis. “Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question: Nation, State and Securitization of Communal Identities in a Regional Context.” South European Society and Politics 13.3 (2008): 391-98. Print.

Carey, James. “Reconceiving “Mass” and “Media”” Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society 2 (2008): 1-16. Print.

Carey, James W. “A Cultural Approach to Communication.” Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 1-27. Print.

Castells, Manuel. The Power of Identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997. 1-31. Print.

Cornell, Savante E. “The Kudish Question in Turkish Politics.” Orbis 1st ser. 45.15 (2001): 31-47. Web.

Çelik, Ayse B. “Track 2 Interventions and the Kurdish Question in Turkey.” International Journal of Peace Studies 12.2 (2007). Print.

Gunter, Michael. “The Kurdish Question in Perspective.” World Affairs 166.4 (2004): 197-205. Print.

Hall, Stuart, David Held, and ,. Tony. McGrew. “Modernity; An Introduction to Modern Societies.” Modernity and Its Futures. Cambridge: Polity in Association with the Open University, 2001. 597-615. Print.

Harvey, David. “Time-Space Compression and the Postmodern Condition.” The Global Transformations Reader: an Introduction to the Globalization Debate. By David Held and Anthony G. McGrew. Malden, MA: Polity, 2000. 83-91. Print.

Hendrick, Joshua. “Globalization, Islamic Activism and Passive Revolution in Turkey: the Case of Fathullah Gülen.” Journal of Power 2.3 (2009): 343-68. Web.

Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests (1993): 1-14. Print.

Inda, Jonathan Xavier., and Renato Rosaldo. “Introduction: A World in Motion.” The Anthropology of Globalization: a Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008. 1-34. Print.

Kuran, Timur. “The Genesis of Islamic Economics; A Chapter in the Politics of Muslim Identity.” Social Research 64.2 (1997). Print.

Mamdani, Mahmood. “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism.” American Anthropologist 104.3 (2002): 766-75. Print.

News, O’Byrne BBC. “BBC News – PKK ‘would Disarm for Kurdish Rights in Turkey'” BBC – Homepage. Web. 07 Dec. 2010. <>.

Schein, E. “On Dialogue, Culture, and Organizational Learning.” Organizational Dynamics 22.2 (1993): 40-51. Print.

Sirkeci, Ibrahim. “Exploring a Kurdish Population in a Turkish Context.” Genius 1 (2000). Print.

Ulusoy, Kivanç. “Governing Turkey towards the European Union.” Society and Economy 30.2 (2008): 339-58. Print.

Zivanov-Kaiser, Emily. “Turkey’s “Kurdish Issue”; A Surmountable Challenge.” NIMEP Insights. Print.

2012 West Coast Model EU; Common Agricultural Policy Reform; Final (passed) Resolutions


Small Farmers Scheme Resolution 2013-2020Signatories: Austria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovakia

1.       Expresses its appreciation for the Presidency’s proposed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms, and emphasizes that any CAP reforms approved by this body should be characterized by themes of improving productivity, environmental responsibility, and ensuring state-state equity;

2.   Affirms the unique position of subsistence-based small farmers (of less than 3 hectares of cultivatable land) and acknowledges the difficult of such farmers to contribute significant attention to environmental priorities;

3. Recommends the Small Farmers Scheme (SFS) as a necessary addendum to the CAP as a mechanism for improving small farmers productivity and equity in receiving CAP assistance, wherein the following measures will be implemented by the CAP between 2013 and 2020:

4.       Small farmers shall have the power to independently opt either to participate in the SFS if:
i.      They are no more than 3 ha;
ii.      They decide by October 15, 2014;

5.       Small farmers who opt to participate in the SFS shall be exempt from applying greening measures and penalties to the agricultural sector established by this Council between 2013 and 2020;

6.       The SFS payments shall neither interfere with nor replace Pillar II Rural Development funds for providing advice to small farmers for economic development and restructuring grants in regions with high concentrations of small farms.

Signatories: Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, Austria, France, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Finland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg

Resolution – Phasing in of dependence on Green Measures for the receipt of subsidies

1. Acknowledges the new challenges which face the Common Agricultural Policy, including climate change, water management, implementation of alternative fuels, and bio diversity while maintaining the common commitment to agricultural productivity and competitiveness;

2. Bears in mind that the European people require a robust and efficient agricultural sector which is capable of meeting the needs of all people;

3. Agrees that the farming subsidy should be conditional on the implementation of greening measures as specified in the “Greening Measures under CAP Reform 2013-2020” resolution hereto for accepted by this body, wherein conditional payments will be implemented in phases across three years where 0% of farmers direct payments will be withheld the first year, 7.5% will be withheld the second, and 15% withheld the final year.

4. Proposes that market incentives are based on each agricultural holding complying with one or more of the five greening strategies. Products produced by compliant farms will be designated as “Save Europe” products.

Greening Measures under CAP Reform 2013-2020

Signatories: Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, UK, Estonia, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Portugal, Cyprus, Finland, Sweden, Czech Republic

1. Recognizes the diversity of the European Union, and supports offering five greening initiatives to encourage ecologically sustainable agriculture and offer a broadened opportunity for small farms to develop agriculturally under them. Agricultural holdings, whom participate in the market economy, may choose one or more of five initiatives to implement.
a. Optional greening measures until the year 2020 include:
1. Maintain a permanent pasture through sustainable and more healthy practices.
2. Biodiversity through three crop rotation
3. Reservation of 7% of arable land for agricultural practices
4. Reduction of 20% of carbon emissions
5. Implementing sound irrigation systems to foster water conservation


Equalized Funding Resolution:
signatories: Slovenia, Estonia, United Kingdom, Romania, Latvia
We should advocate a more equalized funding across all the member states. Romania and the UK propose that there is more equalized funding between Eastern and Western European member states. This funding would go to overhauling the agricultural systems and rural development within the agricultural sectors of the newest member states in order to comply with the greening proposals put forward by the presidency. This funding would last until 2020, when we would re-convene to decide whether to renew this funding or phase it out.

Amendment: 60/40 split instead of the current 50/50 split, with at least 20% of the funds going to rural development within the 12 newest member states.

Signatories: Poland, Denmark, United Kingdom, Slovenia,  Malta, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Signatories: Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Belgium

Capping the CAP Draft Resolution

  1. Recognizes that a cap of €300,000 per farm is neither equitable nor realistic for many member states who rely primarily on large farms for production, Acknowledges the EU values of market economy and fairness, and affirm the importance of individual farms to receive supplemental payments through the Pillar 1 of the CAP;
  2. Encourages a redistribution of funds to agricultural areas throughout the EU that are in highest disparity and gravest need for development, technological investment, and increased competitive advantage, while also affirming the importance of ensuring open agricultural markets as disparities are equalized in the future;

  1. Recommends the EU ought cap Pillar I direct payments to farmers at €500,000 per farm. The remaining or excess funds would be then be redistributed 40% back to the domestic country, and 60% held at the supranational level.

    1. The 40% left to the national government will no longer be restricted solely towards rural development. Funding re-allocated to national governments will be completely at their discretion to distribute these funds in such areas/topics that pertain to agriculture:
      1. Rural development
      2. Innovation and technologies
      3. Agricultural education

    1. The other 60% would be held at the supranational level and allocated towards rural development in areas that require the support the most. At least 20% of this 60% will be dedicated towards the 12 New Member states integrated since 2004.
      1. Building a general agricultural/rural infrastructure structure in places that are severely lacking such;
        1. i.e. building roads, and replacing outdated/non-functional machinery
      2. Modernizing the farming techniques, tools, machinery, and practices that would allow them to compete fairly at the international level
      3. Incentivizing younger generations to enter the agricultural work sector
        i.e. provide scholarships and payments to programs that offer agricultural schooling, such as agricultural economics and business
        i.e. incentivizing business to invest in rural areas

  1. To reward exceptional efforts, agricultural holdings will be exempt from a cap on the CAP if they are able to meet 3 of the 5 greening measures, over a period of four years where;
    1. Zero greening measures need be met in the first year;
    2. One greening measure must be met in the second year;
    3. Two greening measures met in the third year;
    4. Three greening measures met in the fourth and final year.


Pac-12 Model EU; The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; CAP Reform Position Paper

Image<– The Grand Duchy (of Luxembourg)

Bring it, Model EU.

Position Paper

Importance of the CAP

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg acknowledges the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as the main instrument for stabilizing effective, sustainable and competitive European Union (EU) agriculture. Confronting new challenges such as climate change, supply and security of food, energy, environment and biodiversity, the EU must use the CAP to achieve subjective and pragmatic protection of EU agriculture. Thus, negotiations for the future CAP are crucial and should bring a result, which provides advantages for our farmers, consumers and the economy.

Luxembourg recognizes the need to be proactive in CAP reform, for both agricultural and economic demands on the EU have become increasingly larger. Changes in both 1992 and 2003 represented the progressive pragmatism of CAP reform. Such pragmatism should continue, as the CAP represents 40% of the European Union’s funding allocation. Reformation of the CAP must be targeted at a deepening of the funding model, in order to establish a more perfect unification of EU agricultural markets, in order to achieve subjective goals laid out by Agenda 2020.

Agriculture of Luxembourg in relation to Europe

As a formative member of the European Union, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg maintains a favourable relationship with its neighbouring countries in regards to agricultural support Devoting over 50% of the land to agricultural endeavours, with average farm size around 2 hetacres, Luxembourg emulates the type of farming that suffers from the current CAP subsidy model, and yet has the potentiality to represent an ecologically and economically sound agricultural market as a result of CAP reformation; inasmuch as the smaller farming method encourages decentralized farming and agricultural cooperation between farmers (Co-op farming).

Co-op farming represents over 83% of Luxembourgish farms, prompted by farming crises of 1988. These crises were the emergence of an ongoing trend, wherein local farmers were unable to operate independently due to poor yields and market decline. Co-op farming has since gained in popularity, as farmers seek assistance beyond the small CAP subsidies they are provided, due to small farm size. CAP payments do not adequately assist smaller farms, necessitating greater trade expenditure for local markets, resulting in higher priced goods, and decline of agricultural employment. Agriculture represents over 27% of Luxembourg’s employment, making agricultural well being central to economic and social stability. With involvement of over 80% of national revenue in banking, Luxembourg was hit hard by the Euro Zone crisis and seeks to sustain employment and other internal affairs.

Small and local farming in Luxembourg has attracted the attention of several ecologically-minded cooperatives, namely Bio-G, who are interested in promoting “greener” farming among associated farmers. Luxembourgish farming co-ops portray alternative farming and marketing methods that are environmentally and economically sustainable. CAP reform should bolster farming co-op initiatives, in the interest of increasing financial stability for small farmers, and realize local farming advantages, to increase ecological farming methods and European consumer-focused marketing strategies.


Underlining the environmental and economic initiatives of Denmark’s proposed CAP reform, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg respects the consideration for social well being in respect to financing public goods. The alleviation of public goods-related costs to farmers and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, through subsidies, gives Luxembourg the opportunity to further focus resources to the agricultural market itself.

Luxembourg also agrees with a 30% expenditure of the CAP towards ecologically motivated Pillar 1 subsidy payments. Luxembourg emphasizes a 5% CAP Pillar 1 expenditure towards development, in the interest of making use of the rising number of ecologically-minded research in Europe. Research and development is a long-term investment, with guaranteed returns. As the number of educated Europeans grows, allocation of CAP funds towards research supports agriculture, the environment, the economy and most importantly, the opportunity for European innovation and success.

Promotion of another 5% of Pillar 1 CAP funding towards local farming initiatives is encouraged, to create reliably ecological methods in local communities, whereby creating a low-priced and healthier standard for European agriculture. Local farming decreases transportation-related problems, such as gas and energy cost, which increases cost of food for the consumer, and emissions from transportation vehicles. Locally grown food also provides health benefits due to shorter transportation and environmental factors.

Luxembourg strongly disagrees with the €300,000 cap on direct income support subsidies. Such a cap limits the ability for larger farms to operate at full capacity, and negates the possible incentives to farm under the new ecological CAP initiatives. Luxembourg supports a targeted “menu” approach to subsidy payments, with a sliding scale dependent on specific ecological methods used, farm size and production amount. Luxemboug supports the supranational initiative of direct income support payments being distributed directly from the EU, in order to minimize the burden of allocation for individual states. Through direct payments from the EU, the EU can better analyze the state of the agricultural market as a whole.

Denmark’s presidency of the EU shows a dedication to Agenda 2020, represented by a comprehensive Agenda concerning the security of the CAP. In high opinion of the current Agenda initiatives, Luxembourg proposes to open the Agenda for the inclusion of discussion about a farming Co-op subsidy model. Luxembourg maintains this position, due to the large number of suffering small farmers across Europe, and the potential they have for success through cooperative farming. Luxembourg encourages each European country to consider the advantages of local farming, and consider the opportunities for agricultural stability through cooperation, similar to the strength of the European Union.

Pac-12 Model EU; Luxembourg; Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Reform; Draft Resolution


1. Realizes the necessity of greening EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), underlining the financial incentives for delivering public goods as dependent upon;

a. Enforcing ecologically sensible transportation methods, wherein;

i. Regulation of emissions standards by (POLICY) (COMMUNICATION#) is upheld for all transport vehicles.
ii. Incentives towards greener production and transportation methods are subsidized in Pillar 1.


2. Welcomes the restructuring of Pillar 1, conditionally agreeing to 30% of CAP payments towards “‘greening’ measures”, whereby;

a. Technological innovation holds 10% of Pillar 1 subsidy payments, structured accordingly:

i. With funds allocated towards ecologically-minded technological development.
ii. With incentives towards use of “greening” agricultural technology by farmers, through additional subsidy payments.
iii. Whereas, technological development will enhance long-term productivity in ways that reduce environmental impact and help adapt to climate change.

b. Local production and transportation of goods is encouraged through additional subsidy payments, representing 5% of the CAP Pillar 1 budget, in efforts to reduce vehicle emissions and increase local production of goods.

c. Direct Income Support (DIS) remains independent from a E300,000 ceiling, dependent upon:

i. The use of a targeted “menu” approach to subsidy payments, whereby liberalizing DIS away from farm size and crop yield, in order to form a more responsible method of subsidy distribution to smaller farms and movement towards cohesion in environmental efforts across the EU.
ii. Pillar 1-targeted DIS payments remain allocated to farmers by the state, to ensure a more comprehensive system of necessity-based funding allocation.


3. Strongly urges the establishment of a subsidy model under the CAP Pillar 2 to maintain higher multi-annual, contractual subsidy payments to agricultural cooperatives.

a. Whereby, to encourage the growing number of cooperative agricultural efforts within the EU.

i. Insofar as agricultural cooperatives support the “greening” initiative, and the economic stability of Europe’s farmers.

b. Wherein, a sliding scale of subsidy payments is determinate upon:

i. Amount of land owned by cooperative members.
ii. Collective production of all members

c. Under the circumstance that recipients of agricultural cooperative funding are regulated by standards organizations, which are supported by the state Department of Agriculture. (i.e. Demeter and BioLabel)

d. Henceforth to be referred to as the “Co-opportunity model”.